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The evaluation of safety performance in an adopt-
ing organization is one of the important requirements of 
the Occupational Health and Safety Management System 
(OHSMS) i.e., the Occupational Health and Safety Assess-
ment Series (OHSAS) 18001 that provides useful informa-
tion about the quality of system1, 2). An organization certi-
fied by OHSAS 18001 should employ an adequate level 
of safety management and a positive safety culture, which 
reflects the visible commitment of management to safety 
in order to achieve a satisfactory safety performance3, 4). 
Previous studies indicated that the effective safety manage-
ment depends on the existing safety culture and on safety 
management practices5, 6). Both OHSMS and safety cul-
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Abstract: The evaluation of safety performance in occupational health and safety assessment series 
(OHSAS) 18001-certified companies provides useful information about the quality of the manage-
ment system. A certified organization should employ an adequate level of safety management and 
a positive safety culture to achieve a satisfactory safety performance. The present study conducted 
in six manufacturing companies: three OHSAS 18001-certified, and three non-certified to assess 
occupational health and safety (OHS) as well as OHSAS 18001 practices. The certified companies 
had a better OHS practices compared with the non-certified companies. The certified companies 
slightly differed in OHS and OHSAS 18001 practices and one of the certified companies had the 
highest activity rates for both practices. The results indicated that the implemented management 
systems have not developed and been maintained appropriately in the certified companies. The in-
depth analysis of the collected evidence revealed shortcomings in safety culture improvement in the 
certified companies. This study highlights the importance of safety culture to continuously improve 
the quality of OHSAS 18001 and to properly perform OHS/OHSAS 18001 practices in the certified 
companies.
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ture are required to achieve safe practices in an OHSMS-
adopting organization. Without a positive safety culture, an 
OHSMS tends to be a ‘paper exercise’ in a company7).
Many researchers attempted to define the factors that 
constitute a good safety culture in an organization. How-
ever, there is no widely accepted definition and constructs 
for safety culture8 – 10). Safety culture can described as 
learned behaviors reflecting safety management practices11) 
and behaviors in relation to safety in an organization12). It 
reflects the observable efforts or practices that conducted 
by all organizational members towards improving OHS 
on a daily basis13). The aspects of safety culture include 
management commitment to safety4, 14 – 17), employee 
involvement4, 9, 15, 17, 18), safety communication16, 17 – 20), 
safety training15, 16, 17, 20 – 23), reward system24), reporting 
system23, 24), employee empowerment24), policies and pro-
cedures of safety management system9), pressure for pro-
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duction16), local work practices and supervision22), and the 
existence of a learning culture18). The existence of a strong 
safety culture has been demonstrated to have a positive 
influence on safety performance in many industrial set-
tings14). Moreover, the practices of an OHSMS-adopting 
company to improve safety culture may positively impact 
the quality of the systematic management of safety and the 
safety performance.
A certified organization should apply systematic means 
to achieve and maintain a high level of safety perfor-
mance25). The evaluation of safety management factors 
is a preferred approach for the assessment of safety per-
formance, and provides information regarding failures 
of ongoing safety programs prior to the occurrence of an 
accident26). Application of an active monitoring system 
can measure the success of a certified management system 
before accidents occur and can reinforce the achievement 
of the organization in a positive way27). Failure to do the 
proper analysis of safety performance in a certified organi-
zation may ignore the existing shortcomings of an OHSMS 
and lead to the occurrence of adverse events.
Safety performance is traditionally evaluated through 
the application of statistical methods for analysis of acci-
dent or injury data. The indicators of accidents or injuries 
include number, frequency, severity, rates, and their costs 
that are usually referred as lagging (retrospective) indica-
tors. These indicators focus on safety outcomes and mea-
sure the failures of safety programs. Recently, leading 
(prospective) indicators such as safety audits and hazard 
identification have been applied by OHSMS adopting 
organizations to measure the success of a system28 – 30). 
Although it is common to separately employ the lagging 
and leading indicators for measurement of safety perfor-
mance6, 31 – 34), Cooper and Phillips28) suggested the appli-
cation of a combination of these indicators for measuring 
the impacts of safety programs on an organization. These 
indicators are also considered to be long-term measures of 
safety culture35). Hohnen and Hasle36) stated that it is nec-
essary to evaluate a certified management system through 
the application of scale estimation in the work environ-
ment and the qualitative assessment of the influence of an 
OHSMS. Certified organizations usually apply the quan-
titative results of audits to measure the performance of an 
implemented OHSMS37).
OHSAS 18001 establishes a framework to consistently 
identify and control of health and safety risks, reduce 
the potential for accidents, aid legislative compliance, 
facilitate safety management, and improve overall perfor-
mance in adopting firms38). In 131 OHSAS-certified com-
panies in Spain, Fernández-Muñiz et al.39) indicated that 
the senior management commitment and communication 
positively influenced the safety performance. Vinodkumar 
and Bhasi40) studied the safety management practices in 
eight chemical businesses in Kerala, India and found that 
employees in firms with OHSAS 18001 had the high-
est level of safety management practices and better self-
reported safety behaviors compared with employees work-
ing in non-OHSAS firms. The study of Abad et al.41) in 
Spanish OHSAS 18001-certified companies revealed that 
the companies were more likely to exhibit better safety 
outcomes and higher performance compared to non-certi-
fied firms.
OHSAS 18001-certified companies should evaluate the 
safety performance of their systems internally and exter-
nally1). However, some fail to conduct proper evaluations. 
For instance, Chang and Liang42) stated that most of the 
OHSAS 18001-certified organizations in Taiwan had com-
pliances regarding the increases of paper work, cost, and 
the workload of occupational health and safety (OHS). 
These companies weakly follow the certification and inap-
propriately evaluate their safety performance. The study 
of Chen et al.43) in Printed Circuit Board (PCB) manufac-
tures in Taiwan showed that poor personnel cooperation, 
increased equipment investment, and difficulties in select-
ing performance indicators were the key influencing fail-
ure factors thorough the implementation of OHSAS 18001. 
In addition, several authors have criticized the application 
of lagging indicators due to shortcomings such as under-
reporting and measuring the system failures without dis-
closing cause-effect relationships for these indicators28). 
Furthermore, Hopkins44) advised that an OHSMS audit 
does not guarantee the expected level of safety in a certi-
fied organization.
The assessment of the safety literature showed that a 
limited number of studies published the safety perfor-
mance of the OHSAS 18001-certified companies using 
a scientific approach in Iran. Therefore, it is necessary 
to assess OHS and OHSAS 18001 practices in the certi-
fied companies in Iran to provide information about the 
quality of the management system and to identify exist-
ing problems. The present study was conducted after the 
examination of the effect of OHSAS 18001 on occupa-
tional injury31) and safety climate45) for evaluating OHSAS 
18001 practices and to identify shortcomings of the sys-
tems in conformance with the requirements of the standard 
in the certified companies. This study also compared the 
OHS practices in the certified companies with a group of 
non-certified companies.
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Method
This research was conducted to analyze the OHS prac-
tices in three OHSAS 18001-certified and three non-certi-
fied companies in 2011. In addition, OHSAS 18001 prac-
tices studied in the certified companies. The companies 
were manufactures of beverages, chemical, and electrical 
products, as well as goods used in construction and agri-
culture and located in the West Azerbaijan province in Iran. 
The number of employees who worked in the companies 
varied from 230 to 400. Two of the companies were certi-
fied in 2002 and one of them became certified in 2007. The 
Method for Industrial Safety and Health activity Assess-
ment (MISHA) was used to assess the OHS practices in 
both certified and non-certified companies46). A checklist 
was prepared considering all requirements of the OHSAS 
18001 standard1) (revision 2007) to assess the compliance 
level of OHSAS practices with the standard in the certified 
companies. All questions of the checklists were rated on a 
four-point scale from zero to three46) (Table 1).
A series of face-to-face interviews were conducted 
with four key informants of OHSAS 18001 in the certi-
fied companies. These interviewees were asked to describe 
the practices conducted in the companies for complying 
with the requirements of the OHSAS 18001 standard. In 
addition, a total of sixty-five persons, including managers 
(n=15), supervisors (n=10), and randomly selected work-
ers (n=40) were shortly interviewed in the companies. The 
participants were asked to explain their awareness about 
the safety, OHS training experience, and their involve-
ment in the OHS practices. In the certified companies, 
the participants were also asked about their awareness on 
OHSAS 18001, their consultation and involvement in the 
practices conducted by their companies for implementa-
tion and maintenance of OHSAS 18001, and what modifi-
cations were conducted in their jobs and workstations due 
to the implementation of the system. Moreover, OHS and 
OHSAS documents were assessed to identify the compli-
ance with the requirements of the OHSAS 18001 standard 
and to reply the questions in the MISHA checklists. Walk-
through site observations were performed to check the 
safety status in the worksites and the modifications made 
as a result of the implementation of OHSAS 18001. The 
assessments were conducted by the author, who is a senior 
auditor of OHSAS 18001.
Both quantitative and qualitative approaches were 
applied to analyzing the findings. Activity rates (sum of 
scores for activity area/maximum available scores for 
activity area×100) were calculated for each element of the 
OHSAS 18001 standard and MISHA as well as for total 
questions of the completed checklists (sum of scores for 
activity areas/sum of maximum available scores for activ-
ity areas×100). The qualitative assessment was conducted 
using the evidence to identify the shortcomings in the prac-
tices of the certified companies to conformance with the 
requirements of the OHSAS 18001 standard.
Results
The analysis of OHS and OHSAS 18001 practices indi-
cated differences in activity rates among the companies. 
The result of MISHA showed that Certified 1 had the 
highest (53.93) and non-certified 3 had the lowest (9.69) 
activity rates. The activity rate of follow-up element was 
the lowest rate for all companies, particularly for the non-
certified companies (Table 2). The certified companies had 
a higher activity rates than the non-certified companies 
(t(4)= 7.17, p < 0.01). The non-certified companies did not 
have a written safety policy and did not conduct any activ-
ity to follow-up the safety performance.
The assessment of activity rates for the main elements 
of OHSAS 18001 indicated that checking and OHS plan-
ning had the highest and lowest rates respectively. Certi-
fied 1 had the highest and certified 3 had the lowest activity 
rates. The companies slightly differed in activity rates of 
the main elements of OHSAS 18001. They had identical 
rates for review, but certified 1 has a higher rate for OHS 
policy (Fig. 1). Detailed analysis of the activity rates for 
sub-elements of the OHSAS 18001 standard indicated that 
documentation had the highest, but the hazard identifica-
tion, risk assessment and determining control’s item had 
the lowest rate of activity. The rates of other sub-elements 
did not noticeably differ between the companies. The com-
panies had identical rates for documentation, control of 
Table 1. The requirements and the corresponding scores for ques-
tions of the checklists
Requirements Score
Activity is not at an acceptable level. Rules and modes of 
actions are determined only verbally. No visible activities 
can be seen, or activities are only problem-solving in nature.
0 points
Activity is at minimum level. Rules and the methods of 
action are determined and notified. In some areas, activities 
are only problem-solving in nature. However, activities are 
mainly sensible and applicable.
1 point
Improvement process is put into practice. Activity standards 
and rules are obeyed. They are no notable deficiencies in 
activities.
2 points
All issues to be considered as put into effect without weak-
ness of deficiencies. A strong improvement process is in use.
3 points
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documents, control of records, and internal auditing (Fig. 
2).
The certified companies had considerably conducted 
hazard identification and risk assessment for recognition 
of unsafe conditions, but they had only slightly consid-
ered the behavior of employees in their workstations dur-
ing such identifications. They did not identify the hazards 
associated with changes in the organization, its activities, 
or materials and the hazards associated with the design 
of work areas, processes, installations, machinery, and 
equipment. The presence of physical safety hazards such 
as improperly safeguarded machines, unsafe holes and 
obstacles in the surfaces showed that they had not suitably 
controlled such hazards. The companies had documented 
a large number of procedures and instructions based on 
the requirements of the OHSAS 18001 standard; how-
ever, there were shortcomings in their implementation and 
maintenance. The procedures and instructions were needed 
Table 2. Activity rates of the elements of MISHA in the certified and non-certified companies
Certified Non-certified
1 2 3 1 2 3
A. Organization and administration 62.31 52.18 50.72 13.04 14.49  5.08
A1. Safety policy 63.63 57.57 57.57  3  3  3
A2. Safety activities in practice 66.66 50 45.83 29.16 25  8
A3. Personnel management 50 41.66 41.66  8 25  8
B. Participation, communication, and training 54.54 39.39 39.39  9 18.18  9
B1. Participation 55.5 44.44 44.44 11.11 22.22 11.11
B2. Communication 58.33 33.33 33.33  8.33 25  8.33
B3. Personnel safety training 50 41.66 41.66  8.33  8.33  8.33
C. Work environment 53.33 42.22 44.44 17.77 31.11 11.11
C1. Physical work environment 59.25 51.85 55.55 22.22 40.74 11.11
C2. Psychological working conditions 33.33 22.22 22.22 11.11 11.11 11.11
C3. Hazard analysis procedures 55.55 33.33 33.33 11.11 22.22 11.11
D. Follow-up 22.22 11.11 11.11  0  0  0
D1. Occupational accidents and illnesses 44.44 22.22 22.22  0  0  0
D2. Work ability of the employees  0  0  0  0  0  0
D3. Social work environment  0  0  0  0  0  0
Total 53.93 42.42 42.42 12.12 18.18  9.69
Fig. 1. Activity rates of the main elements of OHSAS 18001 in the certified 
companies.
Note: The sub-elements of OHSAS 18001 specified with numbers in Table 3.









Cer�ﬁed 3 Cer�ﬁed 2 Cer�ﬁed 1
A GHAHRAMANI142
Industrial Health 2017, 55, 138–148
new revisions to perform job activities safely. Table 3 pre-
sented the shortcomings identified based on the collected 
evidence.
This study also identified gaps between actual practices 
and the existing documented procedures and OHS instruc-
tions. The certified companies documented good proce-
dures, but they had improperly implemented and main-
tained the requirements of the procedures. For instance, 
the procedure of hazard identification, risk assessment and 
their controls in the companies required the identification 
of hazards and the assessment of the risks of all routine 
and non-routine activities. However, the companies did not 
conduct such identification for all non-routine job activi-
ties. There was also a lack of instructions for performing 
job activities in a safe manner. For example, two of the cer-
tified companies did not use a permit to work system for 
conducting high risk job activities, and one of them only 
applied hot and cold work permits for all high risk jobs. 
Further, employees performed their job activities using 
their traditional methods not as exactly based on the pro-
vided instructions to control of operations.
In-depth analysis of evidence gathered through the 
assessment of documents, site visits, and interviews indi-
cated that the certified companies had problems in the 
implementation and the maintenance of the management 
system. The problems were related to management com-
mitment to safety (items 1-2, 1-3, 3-1-1, and 3-1-2); man-
agers and employees involvement in OHSAS 18001 prac-
tices (items 2-2-1, 3-3-1, and 3-3-2); safety communication 
(items 3-3-5 and 3-3-7); safety training (items 1-5, 3-1-3, 
3-2-1, 3-2-3, 3-2-5, 3-2-6, 3-2-8, 3-3-8, and 4-3-2); inci-
dent/accident reporting, investigation and analysis (items 
4-1-2, 4-3-1, and 4-3-3); audits and reviews (items 4-5-2, 
5-2, and 5-3); policies and procedures (items 2-1-4, 2-3-
2, 2-3-4, 3-6-1, 3-6-2, and 4-4-1); consultation about OHS 
issues (items 3-3-5, 3-3-6), and work plannings (items 2-1-
3, 3-6-6, and 3-7-2). As presented in Table 3, these short-
comings were aspects of safety culture and indicated the 
presence of a poor safety culture in the companies.
Discussion
The present study identified shortcomings in the fulfill-
ment of the requirements of the OHSAS 18001 standard in 
the certified companies. Although the certified companies 
had a better OHS practices in all elements of MISHA com-
pared with the non-certified companies, the assessment of 
the activity rates indicated that there were gaps between 
the existing status of the management systems and the 
requirements of the OHSAS 18001 standard in all certified 
companies. The certified companies prepared a large num-
ber of documents that were required by the OHSAS 18001 
standard; however, they had improperly implemented and 
maintained the requirements of the documents. This study 
also revealed that the certified companies had shortcom-
ings in the components of safety culture.
The current study found that the certified companies had 
a higher OHS activity rates than the non-certified compa-
nies. The comparison of this finding with that found by 
Kussisto46) in a Finnish metal manufacturing company 
revealed that total activity rates for the Finish case was 
lower (M = 39.2) than the rates for the certified compa-
nies (M = 46.25), but it was higher than the rates for the 
non-certified companies (M = 13.33). Detailed assessment 
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Table 3. The results of safety assessments and Identified evidence for poor safety culture in the certified companies
The main and sub-elements of 
OHSAS 18001 Result of assessment
1) OHS Policy 1-1) The existence of written OHS policy in all companies
1-2) Failure of top management to give priority to OHS
1-3) Lack of practical commitment of top management to safety
1-4) Daily exposure of workers with unsafe conditions in the workplaces such as unsafe machines, noise, chemicals
1-5) Lack of awareness among most of interviewed workers of their individual OHS obligations in the policy
2) Planning
2-1) Hazard identification, risk 
assessment and determining con-
trols
2-1-1) Conducting hazard identification and risk assessment by involvement of one or two persons from each department 
and the safety officer in all companies.
2-1-2) The employing of a semi-quantitative method for risk assessment by all companies.
2-1-3) Lack of identification of hazards for the activities of personnel, such as visitors and subcontractors; the hazards 
originating outside the workplace; the hazards associated with changes or proposed changes in the organization, its activi-
ties, or materials; modifications to the OHSMS; the hazards associated with the design of work areas, processes, installa-
tions, machinery, and equipment.
2-1-4) Paying less attention to human behavior and capabilities as well as identification and control of health risks
2-1-5) The control of high risk hazards conducted mostly using safeguards for unsafe conditions of machines and personal 
protective equipment in all companies.
2-2) Legal and other requirements 2-2-1) The identification of the applicable OHS legal and other requirements and provision of them in all companies.
2-2-2)Taking into account some occupational health hazards by the applicable OHS legal and other requirements.
2-3) Objectives and program(s) 2-3-1) The existence of annually documented OHS objectives in all companies.
2-3-2) Lack of consistency between OHS objectives and OHS policy.
2-3-3) Consideration of OHS legal and other requirements only for occupational health hazards.
2-3-4) Lack of conducting OHS programs based on designated characteristics.
3) Implementation and operation
3-1) Resources, roles, responsibil-
ity, accountability and authority
3-1-1) Lack of financial support of top management for finishing OHS improving projects.
3-1-2) Lack of visibly demonstration of managers’ commitment to continual improvement of OHS.
3-1-3) Lack of information of interviewed workers about their OHS responsibilities and top management appointee in 
OHSAS 18001.
3-2) Competence, training and 
awareness
3-2-1) Lack of safety training for the interviewed workers.
3-2-2) Providing OHSAS 18001 familiarization courses only for their managers during the time of implementation of the 
requirements of the standard by all companies.
3-2-3) Recieving only training about the general topics such as fire safety but no training about their jobs’ safety by some 
of the workers (they learnt only by doing).
3-2-4) Lack of education of the workers related to their jobs.
3-2-5) Lack of using result of hazard identification and associated risks to determine training needs.
3-2-6) Lack of effectiveness assessment for the provided general trainings.
3-2-7) Evaluation of the effectiveness of the training provided only by outside organizations using a questionnaire in all 
companies.
3-2-8) Lack of awareness of the workers who were interviewed regarding the OHS benefits of improved personal perfor-
mance; their roles and responsibilities and importance in achieving conformity to the OHS policy and procedures and to 
the requirements of the OHS management system were also lacking.
3-3) Communication, participation 
and consultation
3-3-1) Lack of encouragement of employees to participate in OHS and OHSAS 18001 practices in all companies.
3-3-2) Lack of individual involvement of managers in OHS practices
3-3-3) The use of a top-down flow of information transmission in most cases.
3-3-4) The use of a suggestion box as a convenient way of communication of all interested parties.
3-3-5) Conducting safety activities such as risk assessment and incident investigation by safety department without par-
ticipation and consultation of affected employees.
3-3-6) OHS policy and objectives documented during meetings in different departments of all companies without consul-
tation with affected workers and as approved by top managers.
3-3-7) Lack of communication with the interviewed workers regarding OHS policy, their roles and responsibilities in 
OHSAS, the results of incident investigations, and the results of identified corrective and preventive actions.
3-3-8) Lack of awareness of interviewed workers about their commitment to the requirements of OHSAS 18001, even not 
knowing the implementation of OHSAS after at least 3 years of experience with a certified system.
3-4) Documentation 3-4-1) Providing a large number of documents required by the OHSAS 18001 standard in paper and electronic formats 
by all companies.
3-5) Control of documents 3-5-1) Controling all OHSAS documents based on the requirements of the standard.
3-6) Operational control 3-6-1) Implementation of control measures only for identified high risk hazards.
3-6-2) Lack of controls for the OHS issues related to purchased goods, equipment and services.
3-6-3) Documenting safety instructions for high risk operations by all companies.
3-6-4) Hanging safety signs in risky workstations by all companies.
3-6-5) Hanging brief safety instructions close to the workstations of the high risk operations by two of the companies.
3-6-6) Use of work permits for highly risk operations in one of the companies.
3-7) Emergency preparedness and 
response
3-7-1) Identification of potential emergency situations by all companies
3-7-2) Rarely testing preparedness and response for the identified emergency situations such as evacuation by the com-
panies.
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Table 3. Continued
4) Checking and corrective action
4-1) Performance measurement and 
monitoring
4-1-1) Lack of monitoring for the effectiveness of controls by the companies.
4-1-2)The only use of accident statistics and rates to reactively measure the overall safety performance by all companies.
4-1-3) The measurement of noise, illumination, and some chemicals annually using calibrated equipment by all compa-
nies.
4-2) Evaluation of compliance 4-2-1) Evaluation of compliance with some of OHS legal and other requirements using checklists by all companies.
4-3) Incident investigation, non-
conformity, corrective action and 
preventive action
4-3-1) Recording and investigation of only severe accidents by the companies’ safety officers to discover the direct causes 
of them, but no effort was made to determine their indirect and root causes.
4-3-2) Lack of awareness of interviewed workers who experienced occupational accidents about their involved accident 
investigations.
4-3-3) Proposing corrective actions to control the direct causes of accidents nor root causes.
4-3-4) Identification of non-conformities during the internal and external audits.
4-3-5) Covering the actual OHSAS non-conformities that may have been identified during the external audits in the pro-
cedures not the potential ones.
4-4) Control of records 4-4-1) Establishment and maintaining records in a paper format to demonstrate their conformance with the requirements 
of the OHSAS18001 standard by all companies.
4-4-2) The existence of legible, identifiable and traceable OHSAS documents in all companies.
4-5) Internal audit 4-5-1) Conducting internal OHSAS audits based on audit programs by all companies.
4-5-2) Inadequate planned arrangements of the system in place for leading to a positive continual safety performance in 
all companies.
5) Management review 5-1) Reviewing the OHSMS by top managers of the companies.
5-2) Lack of presention of the real OHS situation in provided documents and information for management review meet-
ings due to inappropriate and detailed assessment of risks without involvement of employees.
5-3) Lack of using proper indicators of safety performance. Such a lack could not lead to a real continual improvement.
of the activity rates indicated that the majority of differ-
ences between the certified companies and the Finnish case 
resulted from the implementation of the requirements of 
the OHSAS 18001 standard in creation of a good amount 
of documentation (structure) for the management of OHS.
The result of this study indicated that the certified 
companies had shortcommings in properly performing 
of OHSAS 18001 practices such as planning for hazard 
identification, risk assessment and control; incident/acci-
dent reporting, investigation, and analysis; safety train-
ing, and operational control. The properly conducting such 
practices are prerequisites for having a safe operation in a 
workplace. Whether these practices peformed poorly, the 
ability of an OHSMS to manage OHS and protect employ-
ees will be limited, and the management system may even 
degenerate into a “paper system”47). This situation can be 
considered as a reason for the existence of paper systems 
in the companies. Therefore, the revision of the practical 
procedures for conducting OHS/OHSAS 18001 practices 
of the companies is necessary to bring the requirements of 
the OHSAS 18001 into practice.
The findings of this study revealed that the certified 
companies established a large amount of documents; 
howere, they did not follow their documented procedures 
and instructions at least five years after the certification. 
This result match that observed in an earlier safety climate 
study, which found the highest scores for safety proce-
dures in the companies45). The problematic gap between 
safety procedures and instructions with practices has been 
highlighted previously in the safety literature48, 49). It can 
be inferred that the companies conducted a lower level of 
efforts in adequately implementation and maintenance of 
the requirements of the documents. Likewise, the insignifi-
cant difference between activity rates of the certified com-
panies in OHSAS 18001 practices and the identical rates 
for documentation, control of documents and records indi-
cating the existence of approximately similiar mechanical 
systems in the companies. The highest activity rates of doc-
umentation and lack of OHS/OHSAS 18001 practices are 
good indicators for the existence of inadequate OHSMSs 
in the companies. Frick50) hypothesized such systems as 
“paper tiger” systems. Since a vital factor to transform of 
a documented or formal (mechanical) system to carry out 
in practice (operational system) in an organization is safety 
culture5), the detailed analysis of collected data revealed 
shortcomings in the components of safety culture.
This study found evidence for existence of a poor safety 
culture in the certified companies. This finding is in aggre-
ment with the result of a recent study, which showed a 
insignificant improvement of safety climate in the com-
panies45). The comparison of the obtained evidence with 
descriptions of levels of safety culture for concrete and 
abstract organizational aspects in the study of Parker et 
al.51) revealed that the companies overally had recative 
or calculative safety culture (see Table 3). The evidence 
also compared with the feautures of a good safety culture 
in an OHSMS-adopting company affirmed by Fernandez-
Muniz et al.9), and it is indicated that the companies had 
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inadequate OHSMS in place to improve safety culture. 
A possible explanation for these situations might be that 
the mechanical implementation of the requirements of the 
OHSAS 18001 standard and the lack of efforts for main-
taining the requirements and improving safety culture in 
the companies.
The safety culture deficiencies in the certified com-
panies have been identified as essential factors in devel-
oping an effective OHSMS for continuously improving 
safety performance3). The weak situations might result 
from the failure of the companies to properly implement 
and maintain essential arrangements and actions required 
by the OHSAS 18001 standard to develop a high-quality 
OHSMS. Since an effective OHSMS in an organization 
results from the combination of the mechanical implemen-
tation of the system and a positive safety culture52) and the 
existence of safety culture deficiencies is an obstacle to the 
effectiveness of OHSAS 1800153), the mechanical imple-
mentation of the requirements of the OHSAS 18001 stan-
dard is not enough to achieve a better OHS performance. 
The establishment of a positive safety culture is a primary 
objective of an OHSMS, which can identify and correct 
safety related problems prior to the occurrence of an acci-
dent43). Furthermore, an adequate level of safety culture 
is needed to support, improve, and effectively work of an 
OHSMS7). Therefore, the practical efforts of the companies 
to improve the safety culture are needed to achieve such 
performance. It can be inferred that the main aim of the 
companies by the implementation of the requirement of 
the OHSAS 18001 standard have not been the reduction of 
OHS risk to achieve a better OHS performance. Because 
obtaining such objectives requires more efforts to conform 
all requirements of the OHSAS 18001 standard and to 
improve the level of safety culture, while the current study 
showed opposite findings.
In this study, evidence such as lacking of OHS pro-
grams’ support and failure to give priority to OHS were 
found as indicators for the lack of managent commitment 
to safety in the certified companies. This finding is con-
sistenet with the results of an earlier study, which showed 
that the lack of management commitment to safety was a 
main barrier to the effectiveness of OHSAS 18001 in the 
companies53). The commitment of the senior manager of 
an OHSAS 18001-adopting company impacts the com-
mitment of employees, and it is a crucial factor to create 
a positive safety culture and a successful OHSMS14). Such 
commitment should be demonstrated in the practices of the 
company. The existence of a poor safety culture and paper 
systems in the companies may particularly relate to lack of 
commitment. The efforts to escalating commitment of the 
managers and employees can help to improve the safety 
culture and to make an effective system in the companies.
The results of this study showed that the OHS and 
OHSAS 18001 practices such as hazard identification, risk 
assessment, and accident analysis mostly performed by 
safety officers and a limited number of personnel. Since the 
culture defined as “the way things are done around here”54), 
the OHS and OHSAS 18001 practices can consider as 
an important indicator of safety culture in an OHSAS 
18001-adopting company. In addition, several reports have 
shown that the employee participation is a decisive fac-
tor in the success of OHSMSs and in the improvement of 
safety culture and safety performance9, 55, 56). Although the 
improvement of safety culture is a time-consuming task57), 
the practices of the companies at least five years after the 
certification indicated that the lack of OHS/OHSAS 18001 
practices existed to change and improve it. This finding 
apparently reveal that the companies did not conduct ade-
quate level of efforts to implement/maintain the require-
ments of the OHSAS 18001 standard and to improve 
safety culture. Since the commitment of a senior manager 
of an OHSMS-adopting company impact the commitment 
of employess and enhance their safe behaviors9), lack of 
OHS and OHSAS 18001 practices and the poor safety cul-
ture may result from inappropriate commitment of senior 
managers of the companies and a low-level of efforts to 
integrate the requirements of the OHSAS 18001 standard 
throughout the process and organizational frameworks.
Providing inadequate safety training for employees 
also found as another indicator of a poor safety culture in 
the companies. The finding is consistent to the outputs of 
prior studies29, 53), which found lacking of safety training 
for managers and employees in manufacturing companies. 
The collected evidence (see Table 3) demonstrates that 
the safety training administered using inappropriate meth-
ods, and the companies provided it for a limited number 
of employees. Arrangment of a continous safety training 
is necessary to develop employee competence and skill, 
and it is highly relevant to employee safe behavior in an 
organization9, 55). Thus, lack of knowledge of the workers 
who were interviewed regarding the OHS/OHSAS 18001 
may impact the participation of them in OHS/OHSAS 
18001 practices. This finding also suggests that the system 
is mostly operated by the higher level personnel (i.e., white 
collar managers) and only slightly by the lower levels of 
the companies. Likewise, OHSAS 18001 is a social sys-
tem and the knowledge of employees and their commit-
ment to perform the requirements of it in practice affect the 
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and proper maintenance of the implemented management 
systems through practically escalating their commitment to 
proper implement and maintenance of the requirements of 
the established systems. The companies should also con-
duct safety training for their employees, communicate and 
consultate with the employees about OHS issues in their 
workstations, and involve them in daily OHSAS and OHS 
practices. Such efforts may help the companies to perform 
the OHS and OHSAS 18001 practices on a daily basis, to 
enhance the level of safety culture, to continously improve 
the quality of the management systems, and to achieve a 
satisfactory OHS performance.
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